NEW PROBLEMS IN INDEMNIFYING AND
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AGAINST LIABILITY UNDER THE FEDERAL
SECURITIES LAWS
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In recent years corporate directors and officers, and their lawyers,
have become aware that the Damocles' sword of personal liability is
as much a part of the furniture of the executive suite as the Bigelow
on the floor. Some of the awareness has been stimulated by the
imaginative advertising of insurance brokers pushing directors' and
officers' liability insurance; some has come from painful personal
experience; but the main source has been the proliferation of lawsuits
seeking (frequently with success) to impose such liability. Much of
this litigation has been based on such traditional grounds as breach
of duty to the corporation, but fertile legal imaginations have conceived novel and alarming theories of liability.
Despite the procedural obstacles which courts and legislatures
have interposed, the stockholder's derivative suit is anything but a
vanishing species of litigation, especially in the federal courts. Federal
courts have, for example, been disinclined to require the plaintiff to
seek the approval of other stockholders before suing and have hesitated to treat ratification of the management's conduct by a majority
of stockholders as a bar to suit.' They have refused to apply state
security-for-expenses statutes when the plaintiff manages to state a
federal cause of action.2 Not even the requirement of Rule 23.1 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that the plaintiff must have owned
his stock at the time of the transaction complained of has been applied to suits brought under section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (1934 Act)3 to recover shortswing profits.4 The general
attitude of the federal courts to stockholders' suits is perhaps epito* Richard Ely Professor of Law, Yale University. B.A. 1936, Dartmouth College; LL.B.
1940, Harvard University.
1. See, e.g., Levitt v. Johnson, 334 F.2d 815 (Ist Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961
(1965); Rogers v. American Can Co., 305 F.2d 297 (3d Cir. 1962); Weiss v. Sunasco, Inc., 316
F. Supp. 1197 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
2. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970).
4. Dottenheim v. Murchison, 227 F.2d 737, 739-40 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S.
919 (1956); Blau v. Albert, 157 F. Supp. 816, 818 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
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mized by the statement of Mr. Justice Black that "derivative suits
have played a rather important role in protecting shareholders of
corporations from the designing schemes and wiles of insiders who
are willing to betray their company's interests in order to enrich
'5
themselves."
There are other developments which may make the ordinary derivative suit a graver threat to corporate directors and officers than
it used to be. Until recently, cases in which directors were held liable
for negligence, untainted by self-dealing, were very infrequent, and it
seemed that a substantial risk of liability existed only when management was guilty of the sort of conduct described by Justice Black.'
But there are modern cases which demonstrate that directors may
still be held liable for the sort of extreme negligence which amounts
to abdication of duty-for example, when a director who knows that
dishonest management is looting the company does nothing more
than resign quietly.7 The Supreme Court's decision two years ago that
the stockholder-plaintiff may demand a jury trial in circumstances in
which the corporation itself could have done so' may yet increase the
risk of liability for simple negligence, although so far there have been
no signs of such a development.
The fastest growing area of personal liability, or at least the one
which has caused the most perturbation, is that which arises from the
increasingly broad construction given the federal securities laws by
the courts. Under the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act),9 a director
may be personally liable to investors who lose money if he signs a
registration statement without taking reasonable care to verify its
accuracy and completeness, and the statement is later found to contain material misrepresentations or omissions." Under section 16(b)
of the 1934 Act,' he can, of course, be made to pay his profit to the
corporation if he sells and buys (or buys and sells) its securities within
a six month period-and the courts have given "buy" and "sell" an
increasingly liberal construction, at the same time growing more and
more generous in computing the amount of his profit. Furthermore,
5. Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 371 (1966).
6. See Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of
Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1095-1101 (1968).
7. DePinto v. Landoe, 411 F.2d 297, 300 (9th Cir. 1969).
8. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (1970).
10. Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).

11. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970).
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as demonstrated by the decision in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,12
an insider who trades in his own corporation's securities without
disclosing material inside information may, under section 10(b) of the
1934 Act 3 and rule lOb-5' 4 promulgated thereunder, be subject to
liability, the extent of which has not yet been clearly determined.
Conceivably, the insider might be liable to every public investor who
bought or sold during the period when the insider was trading in
violation of the rule, for the full amount of each investor's loss. Such
.precedents as now exist suggest that in the ordinary case, the insider
will be compelled at least to disgorge his own profit, plus an amount
equal to any profits made by his immediate tippees. 5 A plaintiff who
seeks to bring his cause of action within section 10(b) must show
some sort of fraud, misrepresentation or nondisclosure "in connection with the purchase or sale of [a] security," but the federal courts
have lately evinced a disposition to give very broad and generous
constructions to all of these terms.18
To make matters worse for peccant insiders, the New York Court
of Appeals recently held that insiders who enrich themselves by unloading their company's stock on the basis of a bad, but as yet unpublished, earnings report can be compelled, under state law, to pay their
profits to the corporation,on the theory that the inside information
was a corporate asset which they had misappropriated for their own
benefit.' 7 Such insiders might, moreover, still be liable to the defrauded purchasers under section 10(b).
Thus, corporate directors and officers may be faced with an
alarming array of potential litigation and liability when, individually
or on behalf of their corporations, they trade in the securities of their
own corporation, when they cause it to enter into transactions in
12. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
14. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1972).
15. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1307-08 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1005 (1971); cf SEC v. Shapiro, 349 F. Supp. 46, 55-56 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); SEC v.
Golconda Mining Co., 327 F. Supp. 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
16. See, e.g., Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life and Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971); Bailes
v. Colonial Press, Inc., 444 F.2d 1241 (5th Cir. 1971); Bryan v. Block & Blevins Co., 343 F.
Supp. 1062 (N.D. Ga. 1972); Collins v. Rukin,' 42 F. Supp. 1282 (D. Mass. 1972); Nanfito v.
Tekseed Hybrid Co., 341 F. Supp. 234 (D. Neb. 1972). But cf.Mount Clemens Indus., Inc. v.
Bell, 464 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1972).
17. Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969). It is
safe to predict that efforts will be made to introduce the rule in other states. Cf. Gildenhorn v.
Lum's, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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which they have some sort of personal interest, or, perhaps, when
they are guilty of fairly gross negligence. How can they protect themselves? One way, of course, is to consult counsel and behave so uprightly that not even the most sanguine member of the plaintiffs' bar
will think it worthwhile to sue them. But this is a counsel of perfection. So long as stock options and takeover bids are prominent features of the corporate scene, it will not be easy for insiders to refrain
from trading personally or on behalf of their companies in their
corporations' own securities or those of other corporations.
Moreover, it is often impractical to disclose every material development as soon as it occurs. There may be compelling and legitimate
business reasons for keeping quiet-for example, in the Texas Gulf
Sulphur case, withholding disclosure of information about a possibly
rich mineral discovery, at least until the corporation had completed
its acquisition of mineral rights in adjoining areas, was crucial., 8 The
law is still in flux; it is not easy for the most experienced lawyers to
say with assurance what is adequate disclosure and when it is required, or what is due care in the preparation of a registration statement. Even an honest and prudent executive, guided by counsel with
a mine detector, may step on a booby-trap. Similarly, it is sometimes
difficult to avoid self-dealing, as when inside directors fix their own
compensation as officers, or a director is also interested in a supplier
or customer of the company.
The obvious techniques of protection-that is, shifting the cost of
litigation and liability-are indemnification by the corporation and
insurance. Of course, if an executive goes to jail, neither the corporation nor an insurance company can get him out. But that risk is small
in the absence of deliberate violation of the corporation and securities
statutes. The more serious risk, which in many cases can be guarded
against, is that the director or officer will incur heavy costs in defending against claims of wrongdoing and perhaps in settling them or
satisfying judgments.
INDEMNIFICATION BY THE CORPORATION

Almost all states now have statutes authorizing the corporation
18. See 401 F.2d at 848. Significantly, the Second Circuit found this argument insufficient
to justify non-disclosure by insiders who were trading in the corporation's securities. But it is
arguable that a corporation which is not trading in its own securities has no duty to disclose,
at least so long as it continues to have a business reason for silence. See Astor v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 306 F. Supp. 1333, 1338-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).

Vol. 1972:1153]

DIRECTORS' LIABILITY

1157

to indemnify its directors, officers, and, in some instances, employees
generally, against the costs of litigation and liability. The most modern and the most permissive provision is section 145 of the Delaware
Corporation Law. 9 The Model Business Corporation Act's provision 21 is virtually identical. It has been adopted in a number of states
already 2' and is likely to be followed in many others. In many or most
of the cases discussed below, the Delaware statute would permit
indemnification. Section 145's provisions may, however, raise diffi.cult questions where litigation against directors or officers is based
on asserted violations of the federal securities laws.
The old Delaware statute, 22 which was copied in many states and
is still the law in some of them,2 did.not deal explicitly with the
situation in which the insider is made a party to litigation, not because-of anything he did in the course of performing his duties to the
corporation but merely because of his status as an insider. In the
typical suit under section 10(b) or 16(b) of the 1934 Act, the insider
defendant has been trading entirely for his own account, without
intending to help or hurt the business of the corporation. But always
under section 16(b), and usually under section 10(b), his vulnerability
to suit rests on the fact that he is an insider. In Tomash v. Midwest
Technical Development Corp.,24 the Minnesota Supreme Court said
that that state's indemnification statuteP (which was like the former
Delaware provision), did not permit the corporation to pay the litigation expenses of a director who was prosecuted under the Investment
Company Act of 1940,'2 giving as one reason the fact that he was not
acting in his capacity as a director but was trading for his own account. If an indemnification statute is so construed, a director cannot
be indemnified for the costs of defending a suit under section 10(b)
or 16(b) even if he is successful on the merits. The new Delaware
statute takes care of this problem by providing that an insider may
be indemnified, whether he is the defendant in a derivative suit or in
19. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (Supp. 1968).
20. ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. § 5 (2d ed. 1971).
21. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.751 (1968); ORE. REV. STAT. § 57.255 (1969); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 23A.08.025 (Supp. 1971).
22. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(10) (1953) (originally enacted as Act of Apr. 15, 1943,
ch. 125, § I, [1943] Del. Laws 44).
23. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.355 (1966); Wis. STAT. Am. § 180.04 (1957), as
amended, (Supp. 1972).
24. 281 Minn. 21, 160 N.W.2d 273 (1968).
25. Act of March 20, 1951, ch. 98, § 2, [1951] Minn. Laws 133. The Act was later amended
in 1969 and is presently codified in MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 301.09(7), 301.095 (1969).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 et seq. (1970).
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a suit brought by an outside buyer or seller of stock, so long as he
was acting "in a manner. . . not opposed to the best interests of the
corporation."7 Some types of insider trading might be held to be
"opposed to the best interest of the corporation"-obviously where
the corporation itself is the victim and perhaps where public knowledge of the insider's conduct would tarnish the reputation of the
company's management. However, in the circumstances disclosed by
most suits under section 10(b) or 16(b), the insider's conduct would
not seem to affect the company one way or the other.
The former Delaware statute prohibited indemnification whenever the director was adjudged liable, without distinguishing between
liability to the corporation in a derivative suit for a breach of duty
and liability to a third party for something done in the corporation's
behalf.2 One could imagine situations in which the director, although
found liable in a criminal prosecution or in a civil suit brought by a
third party, had acted in good faith and with an honest intent to serve
the corporation; such situations, for example, can easily arise under
the antitrust laws. The new Delaware statute permits the indemnification even of an insider who is adjudged liable, "if he acted in good
faith and in a manner he reasonably believed to be in or not opposed
to the best interests of the corporation, and, with respect to any
criminal action or proceeding, had no reasonable cause to believe his
conduct was unlawful. 12 9 It should, however, be noted that under the
new statute indemnification is mandatory only when the director's
defense succeeds "on the merits or otherwise." When two directorofficers of a corporation and the top management official of one of
its subsidiaries tried to compel the company to indemnify them for
the cost of defending a criminal prosecution, the Delaware Superior
Court held that obtaining the dismissal of one count of a criminal
indictment, followed by conviction on all other counts, did not
amount to such "success" as would entitle them to reimbursement of
even that part of their counsel fees which was attributable to the
30
count dismissed.
27. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 145(a)-(b) (Supp. 1968) (emphasis added).
28. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(10) (1953) (originally enacted as Act of Apr. 15, 1943,
cl. 125, § 1, [1943] Del. Laws 44).
29. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (Supp. 1968).
30. Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Wolfson, 264 A.2d 358 (Del. Super. Ct. 1970); cf.
Herald Co. v. Bonfils, 315 F. Supp. 497 (D. Colo. 1970), where the district court, under a
statute of the old Delaware type, ordered self-dealing directors who were partially vindicated
to pay 80% of their own and the corporation's counsel fees.
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Even if the director is actually adjudged liable to his corporation
for a breach of duty, the court is given power under the new statute
to authorize indemnification of some or all of his expenses, if, in light
of the circumstances, it finds him "fairly and reasonably" entitled to
indemnity." Indemnification might be warranted, for example,
where the director's liability is based on a new construction of the
antitrust laws, rule lob-5 or section 16(b), and a court holds that
the law is violated by conduct which, prior to the decision, the director and his lawyer might reasonably have believed permissible.
In practice, of course, the kinds of litigation here considered are
very likely to be settled prior to adjudication. If this happens, the
Delaware statute permits the corporation to pay the expenses of settlement if (1) directors who are not themselves parties to the litigation, (2) stockholders, or (3) independent legal counsel find that the
defendant director or officer acted "in good faith and in a manner
he reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the best interests
of the corporation. ' 32 Directors who are not parties and the independent legal counsel whom the management selects are likely to
be rather charitable in assessing the conduct of a defendant seeking
indemnification. A court might disagree with them if their action
were challenged in a derivative suit, but the statute does not require
that stockholders be informed of such indemnifications and neither
do most by-laws. The SEC could probably require that such information be included in proxy solicitations, but it has not yet done so,
except to the extent that an indemnification payment in excess of
$30,000 might be treated as a "material transaction" with the
33
company.
LIABILITY INSURANCE FOR DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS

Overall, the limits which the Delaware statute places on direct
indemnification by the corporation, if they are honestly observed, do
31. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(b) (Supp. 1968).
32. See id. § 145(d) (The quoted language is derived from sections 145(a) and (b)-section

145(d) requires that the disinterested directors, the stockholders, or the independent legal
counsel determine that the defendant "has met the applicable standard of conduct set forth in

subsections (a) and (b) of this section.")
33. See proxy rule 14a-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (1972), providing for the identification of
the parties on whose behalf the solicitation is made and requiring that "[i]nformation about
the directors or nominees must be furnished, including. . . transactions with the issuer in which
they have a material interest ......
17 C.F.R. § 24.14a-101, schedule 14-A, item 1(t)

(1972), providing for a description of such transactions involving a material interest, does not
require disclosure where "[t]he amount involved in the transaction . . . does not exceed

$30,000." Id. at 360 (instruction 2(c)).
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not seem unreasonable. .However, the statute's last subsection permits the corporation, on behalf of directors, to purchase insurance
against liability, even if the risk against which they are insured would
not be indemnifiable under the other provisions of the statute." The
insurance now on the market is so atrociously drafted that it appears,
however unintentionally, to insure against some types of liability for
conflict of interest and self-dealing. 5 Perhaps the Delaware legislature intended to permit insiders to insure themselves against the consequences of their looting the corporation. But, regardless of the
legislature's intentions, it is very doubtful that the courts of Delaware
or any other state would hold that such a provision repealed the deeprooted policy of the common law against permitting a man to insure
himself against the consequences of his intentional wrongdoing. The
same rationale should apply to insurance against liability for negligence amounting to a total and deliberate abdication of responsibility
which, in fact, is about the only kind of negligence for which directors
have so far been held liable.
The draftsmanship of the present policies is so obscure that it is
difficult to say whether they are intended to cover liability and the
expenses of litigation under the federal securities laws, particularly
sections 10(b) and 16(b) of the 1934 Act. The problem stems from
the fact that in these situations the director or officer has been trading
in the corporation's securities for his own account and not in the
course of his employment with the corporation. (Liability under the
1933 Act normally arises out of acts or omissions within the scope
of the director's duty to the corporation.) The insuring clauses of each
part of the Lloyd's policy, for example, cover loss "by reason of any
Wrongful Act (as hereinafter defined) in their respective capacities of
Directors or Officers. ' 31This language suggests that the coverage is
limited to claims based on the insiders' performance of their duty to
34. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(g) (Supp. 1968). See ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT
ANN. § 5(g) (2d ed. 1971). This provision of the Delaware and Model Business Corporation
Acts has drawn heavy fire from Representative Wright Patman. In a letter dated January 28,
1971, to the Chairman of the National Governors Conference, he urged that states adopting

the Model Business Corporation Act delete this provision, which, he said, "undermines essential safeguards of federal and state law by authorizing a corporation to furnish its directors and

officers with insurance against their own wrongful conduct."
35. See Bishop, supra note 6, at 1088-90.

36. Copies of the forms now in use are contained in the Proceedings of the American Bar
Association National Institute on Officers' and Directors' Responsibilities and Liabilities, Oct.
21-22, 1971. See also Slain, Risk Distribution and Treble Damages: Insurance and Contribution, 45 N.Y.U.L. REv. 263, 275 (1970).
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the corporation. The term "Wrongful Act," however, is defined to
include "any matter claimed against them solely by reason of their
being such directors," 3 which is broad enough to include litigation
under the 1934 Act arising out of an insider's trading for his own
benefit. Finally, the second part of the policy, which insures the individual directors and officers against liabilities and expenses for which
the corporation cannot indemnify them under applicable law, explicitly excludes claims "for an accounting of profits in fact made from
.the purchase or sale by the Assureds of Securities of the Company
within the meaning of section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934" ;38 presumably this exclusion would be unnecessary if such
claims were not otherwise within the intent of the insuring clause. It
is probable that Part I of the policy would be construed to cover any
type of indemnification which the corporation is legally authorized
to make directly to a director or officer.
INDEMNIFICATION AGAINST VIOLATION OF THE FEDERAL SECURITIES
LAWS: SPECIAL PROBLEMS

So far as the law of Delaware and the laws of the numerous other
states which follow Delaware's example are concerned, insiders can
be indemnified or insured, at the corporation's expense, against most
of the risks which they face. But indemnification against liability and
expense arising out of alleged violations of the federal securities laws
presents the additional problem of whether shifting the burden of
liability and/or expense from the individual director to the corporation or an insurance company violates the public policy of the statutes.
The SEC has for many years taken the position that it is against
public policy to indemnify a director against personal liability under
the 1933 Act for damage caused by misrepresentations or omissions
in registration statements.3 Although the SEC's rule has been in
effect for nearly 30 years, there is still no square judicial holding on
the question. However, a recent case, Feit v. Leasco DataProcessing
Equipment Corp.," may provide some guidance. In a class action
37. See note 36 supra.
38. See note 36 supra.
39. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.460, note (a) (1972), which obligates issuers to include in registra-

tion statements a declaration that "the registrant has been advised that in the opinion of the
Securities and Exchange Commission such indemnification is against public policy as expressed
in the act and is, therefore, unenforceable."
40. 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
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brought by Feit on behalf of himself and other persons who had
exchanged common stock of Reliance Insurance Company for a
package of Leasco preferred and warrants, the district court held
Leasco and three of its directors liable under section 11 of the 1933
Act 1 for negligently failing to include material information in the
registration statement filed in connection with the exchange offer.
There was, however, no finding of deliberate deceit.
Subsequent to the district court's decision, Leasco informed the
court that it proposed to pay the entire judgment (plus plaintiff's
costs, expenses and counsel fees in an aggregate of $330,000)"2 and
that it did not intend to seek contribution from the three directors.
It asked the court to include in its final judgment a finding that such
conduct would be consistent with the public policy of the Act. The
SEC, treating Leasco's motion as in effect a declaration of intent to
indemnify the directors, intervened to oppose it. The Commission
contended in essence that "the overriding purpose of Congress was
not so much to impose liability for the benefit of investors injured by
a defective registration statement but rather to stimulate diligence on
the part of those persons who are actually responsible for the preparation of registration statements," from which it follows that "it is
clearly contrary to public policy to allow directors to avoid any consequences for their lack of diligence . . . by indemnification from the
43
issuer."
Even if it is true that Congress in 1933 was more intent on penalizing negligent directors in order to encourage directorial diligence than
on giving defrauded investors a method, more useful than their common law remedy, of recouping their losses, it may not follow that
negligent directors must always bear the full burden of liability. The
1933 Act contains some built-in anomalies which cast doubt on the
practical effect of the SEC's policy, even if the courts agree with the
Commission's views.
41. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970).

42. Nothing was said about the defendants' costs and counsel fees, but it is a safe bet that
Leasco was also willing to bear that burden.
43. Brief for SEC as Intervenor, Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp.
544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). The Commission relied on dicta in Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc.,
418 F.2d 1276, 1288 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970), which held unenforceable,
because inconsistent with the deterrent policy of the 1933 Act, an issuer's contract to indemnify
an underwriter who had deliberately acquiesced in the omission of material facts from an
offering circular. But the court limited its holding to cases where the person to be indemnified
has "committed a sin graver than ordinary negligence." Id.
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The fact is that the 1933 Act makes the issuing corporation its
prime target for civil liability; it is virtually an insurer of the veracity
and completeness of the information in its registration statement. The
corporation's only defense, which would rarely, if ever, be available
where a public issue is concerned, is to show that a plaintiff knew the
true facts and was not misled. Directors, on the other hand, are not
liable at all if they acted in good faith and with reasonable diligence.
Even if they were guilty of deliberate deceit or negligence, the corporation is still jointly liable to investors, who will normally satisfy their
judgment from its assets. Unless the corporation is insolvent, the
plaintiff will have no reason to adopt the more troublesome course
of proceeding against the assets of the individual directors, and there
will be no question of indemnification." Thus, in the ordinary case
when the corporation satisfies the judgment, the problem is whether
and how it can be compelled to seek contribution (or even indemnity)
from its codefendants.
Section 11(f) of the 1933 Act,45 which deals with contribution,
does little to illuminate the problem. In substance, it provides that
anyone liable under section 11 may recover contribution "as in cases
of contract" from any person who would have been liable if sued
separately, provided that the person originally paying the judgment
was not guilty of fraudulent misrepresentation." It says nothing
about whether and to what extent the parties may shift the burden
of liability by agreement among themselves. Writing in 1933, Professor (later Mr. Justice) William 0. Douglas and Professor George E.
Bates said that "it is probable, though not certain, that the parties
liable on the registration statement may by contract allocate inter se
their liability. . . ."I' The uncertainty has not been cleared up in
the intervening four decades.
Although it is doubtful that the SEC could have forced Leasco
to seek contribution, a stockholder could have done so in a derivative
suit. A court confronted with such a suit would have to decide
whether either the policy of the 1933 Act or common law principles
required the directors to contribute. On the one hand, it may be
argued that because the directors were at least negligent, while the
44. If the corporation is insolvent, even an innocent director, who is clearly entitled to be
indemnified for the expenses of his successful defense, would be at best an unsecured creditor.
45. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(f) (1970).
46. Section 18(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78r(b) (1970), contains a similar provision.
47. Douglas & Bates, The FederalSecurities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171, 178 (1933).
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corporation was without fault, as between the directors and the corporation, the former should bear the whole burden because it was
their breach of the duty to use reasonable care in managing the
corporation's affairs which led to the trouble. On the other hand, it
was the corporation which benefited from the violation of the 1933
Act; if it has to return the difference between what it received and
the real value of the securities, it loses nothing except the costs of
litigation. Ultimately, the Leasco court found that public policy was
not violated by an agreement among the parties whereby the three
directors paid to Leasco the comparatively small sum of $5,000 apiece
"in satisfaction of any claims that Leasco may have against said
defendants for contribution.' 8 What the SEC thought of the settlement is not apparent.
Certainly, no public policy is offended if the corporation pays the
expenses of a director's successful defense against an action under
section 11. It can also be argued that, even if liability under the
statute is intended to be punitive, the cost of even an unsuccessful
defense, not being part of the contemplated penalty or of the regulatory scheme, can properly be paid by someone other than the guilty
director.49 Similarly, one who successfully defends against a suit
under section 10(b) (to the extent that liability is sought to be predicated on breach of a duty which would not exist if the defendant were
not a director or officer) or under section 16(b) of the 1934 Act, might
properly be indemnified, since vulnerability to such litigation
is an
incident of employment as a director or officer.
Indemnification of insiders who are not vindicated in section 10(b)
or 16(b) litigation presents problems similar to those discussed in
connection with suits under section 11 of the 1933 Act. The purpose of liability under section 16(b) is clearly penal rather than
compensatory, since the corporation (which gets the insider's
illegal profit) has not in fact suffered any harm. Accordingly, public
policy would seem to prohibit any form of indemnification against
such liability (as distinct from litigation expenses). Where a director
48. Order, Civil No. 69-1329 (E.D.N.Y., July 31, 1972).

49. Cf. Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687 (1966), in which it was held that public policy
was not violated when a securities dealer was allowed to deduct as a business expense the cost
of an unsuccessful defense against a criminal prosecution under the 1933 Act. The Court

considered that the public policy in favor of adequate defense against criminal charges was
stronger than any policy expressed in the penal provisions of the 1933 Act. Tellier had not
attempted to deduct the fine he paid, and doubtless no such deduction would have been permit-
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or officer is found liable under section 10(b), the propriety of indemnification may depend on whether the principal purpose of such liability is considered to be compensation of the victims or punishment and
deterrence of the misuse of inside information. The fact that section
32 of the 1934 Act5" imposes criminal penalties for willful violations
of the Act suggests that punishment is not the prime purpose of civil
liability under section 10(b). This distinction may depend on whether,
in the particular case, the insider's conduct was a deliberate violation
of the statute, or was done in the reasonable but mistaken belief that
it was lawful. However, the Fourth Circuit held in Baumel v. Rosen5
that victims of even an apparently deliberate violation of section
10(b) by insiders purchasing stock were entitled only to damages and
not to the punitive remedy of rescission. The court, in part, based its
conclusion on a finding that the purpose of section'10(b) was compensatory rather than punitive.s2
The SEC's position in the Leasco case was not strengthened by
the fact that it has never objected to insurance protecting both the
corporation and the directors against liability under the 1933 Act,
even if the corporation pays the whole cost of such insurance. If it is
against public policy for directors to make contractual arrangements
relieving themselves of fear of liability for negligent violations of the
1933 Act, that public policy should forbid insurance, even if the
director pays for it himself. But it has never been thought in such
other contexts as automobile insurance that the role of civil liability
in deterring careless driving makes it illegal for drivers to insure
themselves against liability.
Perhaps the validity and enforceability of insurance against liability and expense under the securities laws .is an academic question.
The legality of such insurance might be questioned in a stockholder's
derivative suit, if the stockholder discovered that a policy existed and
if the premiums were so great-and they have recently been raised
to very high levels-that the saving to the corporation by forbidding
it to pay for such insurance would justify the allowance of a substantial fee to the plaintiff stockholder's lawyer. A state agency regulating
insurance might question such policies. It would not be likely to do
50. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1970).
51. 412 F.2d 571 (4th Cir. 1969).

52. To similar effect, see Globus v. Law Research Serv., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970); Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,

395 U.S. 977 (1969).
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so-the principal result would be to cause corporations and insiders
to buy insurance in London. The insurer might itself raise the
issue-but this is very unlikely, since the sale of such policies has
probably been too lucrative to abandon. In one way or another directors will probably manage to protect themselves against such liability,
so long as it is based on nothing worse than negligence. It is unlikely
that the SEC will hold that it is illegal for a director to purchase
insurance against such liability, and still more unlikely that the courts
will do so. But if the director can purchase such insurance, the corporation can pay for it. As the Commission has conceded, the policy's
coverage can be made to include directors as well as the securities
issuer for little or no additional premium. If insurers were to justify
a higher premium by arguing that the addition of negligent directors
would prevent the insurance company's being subrogated to the
corporation's right of contribution, it would as a practical matter be
very difficult to keep the corporation from paying the additional
premium simply by increasing the director's compensation in an
amount sufficient to pay for insurance.

